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____________ 
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_____________ 
 
No. 14-3560 
____________ 
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v. 
 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 23, 2015 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 13, 2015) 
 
____________ 
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OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) action arising from an 
alleged wrongful termination or failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.  
Appellant Laureen Bull, having suffered an adverse jury verdict, challenges the District 
Court’s denial of her motion for a new trial.  Appellee United Parcel Service, Inc. 
(“UPS”) cross-appeals the District Court’s denial of its motion for a directed verdict.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Bull’s motion for a 
new trial and dismiss the cross-appeal as moot. 
I. 
 Bull is a 58-year-old woman who worked for UPS in an Edison, New Jersey 
warehouse from 1986 until 2006.  In December 2005, a packaged snow-blower fell on 
Bull while she was working and caused significant bruising and strain to her right 
shoulder and neck.  Appendix (“App.”) 30.  Dr. Katalin Hovath initially diagnosed Bull’s 
injuries and imposed a 25-pound lifting restriction.  Id.  In a follow-up visit a week later, 
Dr. Hovath maintained the 25-pound lifting restriction and referred Bull to a specialist.  
App. 38.  The specialist, Dr. Teresa Vega, prescribed a 20-pound lifting restriction.  App. 
49-50. 
                                                          
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 During the initial phase of her recovery, Bull performed “light duty” clerical work 
for UPS.  App. 1309.  She exhausted her entitlement to light duty work in February 2005 
and went on workers’ compensation leave.  App. 1312. 
 On March 29, 2006, Dr. Vega determined that Bull had reached maximum 
medical improvement and removed all prior restrictions except a 10-pound overhead 
lifting restriction.  App. 68, 1249.  Bull returned to work at the Small Sorts Department at 
UPS that day.  App. 1314.1  She initially worked as a “bagger,” placing small packages in 
a mesh bag and transferring them to a conveyor.  Id.  These bagging duties did not entail 
overhead lifting.  App. 1315, 1880.  Bull also worked at a “Sorts” table, placing small 
packages on chutes.  App. 1315-16.  This also required no overhead lifting.  App. 1316.2  
Bull performed her work without incident.  Id. 
 On April 3, 2006, Janet Liposky3 asked Bull to help her at a de-bagging station.  
App. 1847-48.  Bull explained that she could not lift anything heavy.  App. 1848.  At that 
point, Liposky reached out to Human Relations while Bull finished her shift.   
 The next day, Liposky approached Bull and told her that she could not assign 
work to her because she was on permanent disability.  App. 1849.4  UPS’s Occupational 
                                                          
1 The jury heard conflicting evidence about whether Bull submitted Dr. Vega’s 
instructions to her manager, Janet Liposky, at that time.  See App. 1314, 1845. 
2 However, multiple witnesses at trial testified that Small Sorts work does require lifting 
up to 70 lbs.  App. 1555, 1767-79, 1844. 
3 The parties’ briefs and the record spell Liposky’s name inconsistently as “Liposky” or 
“Lipofsky.” 
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Health Manager, Kathleen Deady, testified at trial that an employee returning from 
workers’ compensation leave normally must provide a medical note to her supervisor 
attesting that she can perform the essential job functions.  App. 1686-87.  Absent such a 
note, Bull should not have been allowed to return to work in the first place.  Id.  Deady 
further testified that if a medical disability prevented an employee from performing the 
essential functions of a job, Deady’s job was to work with the employee to determine if a 
reasonable accommodation could be made.  App. 1626-28.  Deady did not participate in 
any such process with respect to Bull.  App. 1628-29.  She opined that she would have 
initiated the process if she had seen Dr. Vega’s March 29 note.  App. 1688.5 
 Bull contacted her union representative, who told her that UPS needed medical 
documentation that she was fit.  App. 1322-23.  There is some evidence of a 
miscommunication here.  Bull’s union representative apparently believed – and 
communicated to UPS – that Bull sought only to return to full duty in Small Sorts.  App. 
1551, 1767.  UPS therefore requested medical notes clearing her for the essential 
requirements of that position.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Bull claims that Liposky fired her during this confrontation, App. 1318, but all other 
trial witnesses, including Bull’s union representative, agree that UPS did not formally 
terminate her at that time.  See, e.g., App. 1617, 1752-54.  Bull no longer drew a regular 
salary, App. 1320-21, but she did receive checks for previously-accrued vacation and 
holiday pay.  App. 1720-21.  These checks stopped after May 10, 2007.  App. 1730.   
5 Labor Relations Manager Sal Messina cast some doubt on this testimony by asserting 
that Deady herself apprised him of the contents of Dr. Vega’s March 29 note in early 
April 2006.  App. 1539-40, 1548. 
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 In June 2006, Bull saw Dr. Morton Farber and obtained a note assuring UPS that 
she could lift “50 pounds or more.”  App. 75.  Labor Relations Manager Sal Messina 
determined this note was not sufficient to return Bull to work.  His understanding was 
that employees in Small Sorts need to be able to lift 70 pounds.  App. 1553-55.  He did 
not consult Human Resources or ask Deady to evaluate the possibility of accommodation.  
App. 1571. 
 Bull’s union representative then told her that UPS required a note saying she could 
lift 70 pounds.  App. 1326.  In August 2006, Bull returned to Dr. Farber’s office and, 
without actually seeing Dr. Farber, App. 1484, obtained a note stating that “[the] patient 
is not able to lift over 70lbs.”  App. 77.  UPS doubted the validity of the new note.  App. 
1576, 1579, 1589.  It contacted Dr. Farber’s office for clarification.  In September 2006, 
Dr. Farber faxed UPS a note stating Bull could not lift more than 50lbs.  App. 424.  UPS 
advised Bull’s union representative that it could not allow her to return to work on the 
basis of this note.  App. 846.  Bull’s union representative tried to follow up with Bull in 
September and October, App. 433-34, but Bull did not respond.6 
  In April 2007, Bull filed this suit alleging, among other things, wrongful 
termination based on her disability.  App. 134-51.  After a second trial,7 the case went to 
the jury.  Bull’s counsel objected to the formulation of the verdict sheet on the grounds 
that Interrogatory #3, “Ms. Bull was terminated by United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS); 
                                                          
6 Bull allegedly contacted the union in September 2006 about filing a grievance on her 
behalf but received no response. 
7 The first trial ended in a mistrial. 
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[Yes/No],” and Interrogatory #4, “In terminating Ms. Bull, UPS discriminated on the 
basis of her disability; [Yes/No],” App. 103, should have been consolidated into a single 
question — “UPS’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation resulted in a 
termination of Miss Bull; [Yes/No]” — and moved to the end of the verdict sheet.  App. 
103, 1919-20.  Bull’s argument was that if the jury found in response to Interrogatory #8 
that UPS had failed to reasonably accommodate Bull, then as a matter of logic it would 
have to find that UPS had terminated her.  The District Court’s formulation of the verdict 
sheet allowed the jury to find that UPS wrongfully failed to accommodate Bull but did 
not terminate her employment.  And in fact, that was the verdict the jury ultimately 
delivered. 
 Bull moved for a new trial on the bases that the verdict sheet was defective and the 
jury had delivered an internally inconsistent verdict.  UPS renewed an earlier motion for 
judgment as a matter of law based on the argument that the Labor Relations Management 
Act preempted Bull’s claims.  The District Court denied both parties’ motions.  Both 
parties timely appealed. 
II.8 
                                                          
8 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse 
of discretion.  Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2007).  In determining whether 
the jury instructions stated the proper legal standard, our review is plenary, but we review 
the refusal to give a particular instruction or the wording of instructions for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008).     
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 “[A] mistake in a jury instruction constitutes reversible error only if it fails to 
‘fairly and adequately’ present the issues in the case without confusing or misleading the 
jury.” Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 79 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
United States v. Ellis, 156 F.3d 493, 498 n.7 (3d Cir. 1998)).  The structuring of special 
verdict interrogatories is particularly within the trial court’s discretion, and “[t]he only 
limitation [on this discretion] is that the questions asked of the jury be adequate to 
determine the factual issues essential to the judgment.”  McNally v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 
815 F.2d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 1987) (second alteration in original). 
 “When the [jury] answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is also 
inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment must not be entered; instead, the court 
must direct the jury to further consider its answers and verdict, or must order a new trial.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b)(4).  However, a court may order a new trial based on inconsistent 
verdicts only if “no rational jury could have brought back the verdicts that were 
returned.”  Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 739 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks 
omitted).  It is our duty “to attempt to harmonize the [jury’s] answers, if it is possible 
under a fair reading of them: ‘[w]here there is a view of the case that makes the jury’s 
answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.’”  Gallick v. 
Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963) (quoting Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. 
v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)). 
 Bull argues that the order of interrogatories in the District Court’s jury verdict 
sheet failed to advise the jury that UPS’s failure to accommodate Bull’s disability could 
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result in her “de facto” termination.  In effect, Bull contends, the verdict sheet gave the 
jury a mistaken impression that Bull had to prove termination as an independent element 
in her “failure to accommodate” claim. 
 “N.J.A.C. 13:13–2.5(b) requires an employer to make a ‘reasonable 
accommodation to the limitations of an employee . . . who is a person with a disability.’”  
Potente v. Cnty. of Hudson, 900 A.2d 787, 791 (N.J. 2006).  Generally, a prima facie 
case of failure to accommodate under the LAD9 requires proof that “(1) the plaintiff had a 
LAD handicap; (2) was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or 
without accommodation; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of the 
handicap.”  Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 150 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citation omitted).  In Victor v. State, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered 
but did not decide whether a failure to accommodate claim could exist without an adverse 
employment action.  4 A.3d 126, 149 (N.J. 2010).  It noted, however, that the 
circumstances in which a failure to accommodate did not result in an adverse 
employment consequence would be rare.  Id. at 148-49.   
                                                          
9 Bull pled her claim as one for wrongful termination, not failure to accommodate.  See 
App. 145.  However, even when a plaintiff does not plead a failure to accommodate as a 
separate cause of action, we will analyze her LAD claim under that framework when “an 
employer, rather than defending [its actions] on the grounds that the employee was 
terminated for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, proffers the employee’s inability to 
perform the job as a defense.”  Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826, 837 (N.J. 
2002).  Because UPS raised such a defense, the District Court treated Bull’s claim as one 
for failure to accommodate.  App. 12. 
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 The jury’s finding that UPS failed to accommodate Bull but did not terminate her 
or discriminate against her on the basis of her disability pulls at that dangling thread in 
New Jersey law.  Bull argues that the jury should not have been asked to find termination 
as a separate element because UPS’s failure to accommodate Bull was a de facto 
termination.  She cites Seiden v. Marina Associates’s holding that “[i]f . . . the employer 
denies an employee an opportunity to continue with employment because the employee 
suffers from a disability that could reasonably be accommodated . . . that in itself is an 
unlawful employment practice and a violation of the LAD.”  718 A.2d 1230, 1234 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).   
 We find the Seiden decision inapposite.  The Seiden plaintiff was indisputably 
fired.  The court did not discuss the definition of an adverse employment action but 
explained that a plaintiff alleging a failure to accommodate does not have to prove 
anything about the treatment of nondisabled employees.  See id.  Applying Seiden to the 
facts here, where Bull has not established an adverse employment action, would collapse 
the traditional elements of the prima facie case.  Although the New Jersey Supreme Court 
may later decide to strike “adverse employment action” as a distinct element in a failure 
to accommodate claim, it has not yet done so.  See Victor, 4 A.3d at 149.  Under current 
law, it is possible to read the jury’s verdict as finding the rare circumstance in which an 
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employer failed to accommodate an employee but the employee suffered no adverse 
consequence.  We are bound to adopt that reading.10 
  During summations, Bull’s counsel argued its theory that UPS’s failure to 
accommodate resulted in a de facto termination. App. 1986.  The jury returned a negative 
verdict.11  We agree with the District Court that the jury might have believed that UPS 
did not initially accommodate Bull upon her request to return to work, but neither did it 
fire her, and communications simply broke down without clear fault.  Whether this is the 
only or even the best reading of the jury’s verdict is beside the point:  “[w]here there is a 
view of the case that makes the jury’s answers to special interrogatories consistent, they 
must be resolved that way.”  Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 369 U.S. at 364. 
III. 
 UPS argues on cross-appeal that federal labor law preempts Bull’s discrimination 
claims because her prima facie case requires interpretation of the collective-bargaining 
agreement between UPS and Bull’s union.  Because we will affirm the District Court’s 
                                                          
10 Bull might have established adverse employment consequences short of outright 
termination, but she chose to pursue a termination theory.  She initially pled her claim as 
one for wrongful termination, see App. 145 (“Defendant’s unlawful termination of Ms. 
Bull constitutes handicap discrimination within the meaning of the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination.”), and she conceded at various points that she would have to 
prove termination.  See Supp. App. 10, App. 835.  In her own proposed jury instructions, 
Bull stated that “[i]n order to make her claim of disability discrimination, [she] must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . she . . . was fired . . . .”  Supp. App. 
152.  The District Court’s final jury instructions included this requirement:  “[I]t is the 
plaintiff’s burden to show . . . that the plaintiff was fired . . . .”  App. 2012. 
11 Counsel did not request that the jury be instructed on the point, but the District Court’s 
jury charges did not rule out such a theory.   
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order denying Bull’s motion for a new trial, we will not reach the merits of UPS’s cross-
appeal.  The cross-appeal will therefore be dismissed as moot. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying 
Bull’s motion for a new trial (14-3424), and we will dismiss as moot UPS’s cross-appeal 
from the denial of its motion for a directed verdict (14-3560). 
